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ABSTRACT 
Emotion regulation has taken on a growing role in the study of psychopathology, 
both in research as a process, and as a part of a treatment. The interest in emotion 
regulation has led to an increase in the assessment of this construct, primarily with 
explicit measures of emotion regulation. However, explicit measures are limited in that 
they are retrospective, subject to response biases, and impacted by method effects. 
Further, explicit measures only assess single strategies of emotion regulation at a time. 
Implicit measures of emotion regulation are not subject to these limitations.  
One implicit measure of emotion regulation is Etkin’s Emotional Conflict Task, 
which conceptually follows the Stroop task. The current study utilized the Emotional 
Conflict Task, but examined psychopathology dimensionally instead of categorically. 
This allowed for more precise assessment of psychopathology and increased statistical 
power, without the loss of information inherent to categorical assessment. Until now, the 
Emotional Conflict Task has only been examined in a few clinical samples, and only with 
very small sample sizes. This study examined convergent and divergent validity of the 
 viii 
Emotional Conflict Task as well as incremental validity over current measures of emotion 
regulation.  
Sixty outpatients with anxiety and mood disorders completed the Emotional 
Conflict Task and a standard battery of questionnaires, along with a semi-structured 
diagnostic assessment, as part of their intake assessment when presenting for assessment 
and treatment at the Center for Anxiety and Related Disorders. Convergent validity of the 
Emotional Conflict Task was assessed by correlating it with two explicit measures of 
emotion regulation. Next, hierarchical regression was used to examine incremental 
validity of the Emotional Conflict Task, specifically the amount of variability in 
functional impairment accounted for, as measured by the Work and Social Adjustment 
Scale. Finally, this measure was correlated with dimensional measures of 
psychopathology and temperament to assess the differential relations between these 
constructs. Results indicated that the Emotional Conflict Task did not correlate with 
explicit measures of emotion regulation, was not predictive of functional impairment, and 
was not correlated with dimensional measures of psychopathology or temperament. 
Potential causes for these null findings and future directions are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The field of emotion regulation has developed dramatically over the past two 
decades. The importance of emotion regulation has grown from a concept that was barely 
discussed to one that is described across many disorders (Jazaieri, Urry, & Gross, 2013), 
included as the focus of treatments (see Kring & Sloan, 2009, for examples), and 
suggested as an additional classification system of psychopathology (Berenbaum, 
Raghavan, Le, Vernon, & Gomez, 2003). This increased focus on emotion regulation’s 
role in psychopathology and treatment has also led to an increased demand for accurate 
assessment. While a number of measures exist to explicitly assess emotion regulation, the 
ability to assess it implicitly has been lacking. This study examines an implicit measure 
of emotion regulation, with the goals of assessing its convergent, divergent, and 
incremental validity with current measures of emotion regulation as well as its 
relationship with transdiagnostic, dimensional measures of psychopathology and 
temperament. 
History of Emotion Regulation 
A discussion of emotion regulation must begin with a discussion of emotion. The 
“Modal Model” of emotion is one very common model of emotion, which can be 
summarized as “a person-situation transaction that compels attention, has particular 
meaning to an individual, and gives rise to a coordinated yet flexible multisystem 
response to the ongoing person-situation transaction” (Gross & Thompson, 2007, p. 5). 
Gross and Thompson identified four aspects of emotion in the modal model: an activating 
situation, attention, appraisals of the situation, and an emotional response. They note that 
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because each of these aspects differ from person to person, people experience emotions 
differently, even given the same situation. Emotion has several functions including 
survival (e.g., fear of an oncoming car), motivational (e.g., anxiety to meet an upcoming 
deadline), and social (e.g., happiness at seeing a loved one). This basic model was further 
updated by Feldman-Barrett, Ochsner, and Gross (2007) who looked at the heterogeneity 
of responses seen in emotions. 
With a basic definition of emotion, we can begin to look at the broad concept of 
emotion regulation. This is particularly important as there are a variety of definitions of 
emotion regulation (Bloch, Moran, & Kring, 2009). Bloch and colleagues reviewed an 
extensive range of definitions, beginning with Dodge’s (1989) early, broad definition, the 
process by which one response domain impacts another response domain. Shortly 
thereafter, Thompson (1994) described emotion regulation as containing both intrinsic 
and extrinsic processes to monitor, evaluate, and modify emotion reactions. Also seminal 
was Gross’s definition of “processes by which individuals influence which emotions they 
have, when they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions” (1998, 
p. 275). Of note, Gross’s definition focused solely on one’s impact on one’s own 
emotions, neglecting the impact of others. This was changed when Gross and Thompson 
(2007) combined their ideas resulting in a new definition of emotion regulation: the 
automatic or controlled, conscious or unconscious process of individuals influencing 
emotions in self, others, or both. This regulation can involve increasing or decreasing 
positive or negative emotions, and can occur during any of the four stages of an emotion 
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(situation, attention, appraisal, or response), or before any of them occur through situation 
selection.  
While this definition has the benefit of being broad and inclusive, it glosses over 
the fact that emotion regulation is a multi-faceted concept. In their review of neural 
pathways associated with emotion regulation, Phillips, Ladouceur, and Drevets (2008) 
found different neural networks affiliated with voluntary as opposed to automatic 
emotion regulation. They found voluntary emotion regulation focused more on the 
prefrontal cortex, specifically the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and orbital frontal cortex. 
In contrast, automatic processes of emotion regulation focused on the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), right orbital frontal cortex, and parahippocampal gyrus. Examining a 
different subject area, but utilizing similar methodology, Ranganath, Smith, and Nosek 
(2008) completed a multi-method assessment of attitudes using both implicit (e.g., go/no-
go task) and explicit (e.g., attitude questionnaire) measures that were both voluntary (i.e., 
allowed time for reflection) and automatic (i.e., did not allow time for reflection). 
Utilizing confirmatory factor analysis, they found that a one-factor model of attitude fit 
the data poorly. In addition, a two-factor model which split the tasks based on the 
automaticity of the task fit the data better than a two-factor model which split the tasks 
based on whether they were implicit or explicit measures. This suggests that there are 
distinct, though certainly related, constructs being tapped by automatic versus controlled 
reporting, which will allow for complementary data to be gathered by these separate 
approaches. Given these distinct facets to emotion regulation, and the broad definition of 
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emotion regulation provided above, this study will focus particularly on the ability to 
pursue goal-directed behavior in the face of emotional conflict. 
Classically, emotion regulation has been examined by dividing it into specific 
strategies that are used to regulate emotions including acceptance, problem solving, 
reappraisal, avoidance, rumination, and suppression. These strategies have often been 
divided into adaptive (acceptance, problem solving, and reappraisal) and maladaptive 
(avoidance, rumination, and suppression), and extensive studies have examined 
advantages and disadvantages of each of these strategies (see Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & 
Schweizer, 2010, for a review of negative emotions, and Carl, Soskin, Kearns, & Barlow, 
2013, for a review of positive emotions). However, this idea is under debate with newer 
lines of research calling it into question. Altamirano, Miyake, and Whitmer (2010) found 
rumination to be useful when a singular goal requires focus in the presence of distractors. 
Butler, Lee, and Gross (2007) show that culture moderated the maladaptive nature of 
suppression, and Shepps, Catran, and Meiran (2009) found reappraisal to be costly and 
ineffective in highly emotional situations. Further, Shepps, Brady, and Samson (2014) 
demonstrate that in high stress situations, distraction was more effective and less 
cognitively demanding than reappraisal. Additionally, there has been a focus on the 
importance of flexibility in emotion regulation (Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & 
Coifman, 2004; Westphal, Seivert, & Bonanno, 2010). Bonanno and colleagues show that 
the ability to use emotion regulation strategies flexibly (specifically suppression and 
expression) was associated with higher self- and other-rated adjustment in times of stress. 
It was also associated with lower levels of distress several years after a traumatic event. 
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This was true even for a classically maladaptive strategy of emotion regulation (i.e., 
suppression). 
Importance of Emotion Regulation to Psychological Health 
Difficulties with emotion regulation are identified across psychological disorders 
and disorder categories. Gross and Levenson (1997) identified emotion regulation 
difficulties as occurring in nearly half of the Axis I disorders, and all of the Axis II 
disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (4th ed.; DSM-IV; 
American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994), and emotion regulation has been shown 
to mediate the relationship between psychiatric disorder and functional impairment (e.g., 
Au, Dickstein, Steenkamp, Salters-Pedneault, & Litz, 2012). Emotion regulation has been 
studied in many different ways, including both strategy focused, as well as temporally 
focus. Below are two reviews of emotion regulation strategies. The first focuses on the 
most common strategies. The second is organized around the temporal stages of an 
emotion (i.e., Gross’s process model, Gross & Thompson, 2007). 
Emotion Regulation Strategies 
Six emotion regulation strategies have emerged in the literature as the most 
commonly examined. They are acceptance, avoidance, cognitive reappraisal, problem 
solving, rumination, and suppression. A description of each, as well as a brief statement 
of their efficacy, follows. 
Acceptance is a willingness to experience internal experiences without attempting 
to modify their form, frequency, or intensity (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999), and 
focuses largely on the appraisal aspect of emotion, though also limits the development of 
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secondary responses (e.g., anger at feelings of sadness). A lack of acceptance (i.e., 
experiential avoidance) has been negatively associated with quality of life, distress 
tolerance, positive affect, and positive life experiences; it has been positively associated 
with substance abuse, self-harm, posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms, and anxiety 
symptoms (see Boulanger, Hayes, & Pistorello, 2009, for a review). Acceptance is an 
explicit target of a number of therapies, including acceptance and commitment therapy 
(Hayes et al., 1999), mindfulness based stress reduction (Kabat-Zinn, 1982), and 
dialectical behavior therapy (DBT, Linehan, 1993). Acceptance has generally positive, 
though inconclusive, support for its effectiveness as an emotion regulation strategy (e.g., 
Aldao et al., 2010; Kollman, Brown, & Barlow, 2009). 
Avoidance can take several forms, including cognitive, behavioral, and 
interoceptive avoidance. Early work on behavioral avoidance linked it closely with 
maintaining psychopathology, particularly anxiety disorders, through the lack of 
opportunities for extinction (Mowrer, 1947). Consequently, addressing behavioral 
avoidance is a staple of cognitive behavioral treatments, including transdiagnostic 
treatments (Fairholme, Boisseau, Ellard, Ehrenreich, & Barlow, 2009). The avoidance of 
emotions and internal experiences has become a target of treatment (Hayes et al., 1999).  
Cognitive reappraisal consists of examining the evidence for and against a 
thought as well as considering alternative thoughts and their respective evidence, and has 
been an explicit target of treatment through cognitive therapy for nearly 50 years (Beck, 
1967). Extensive research has demonstrated links between psychopathology and negative 
cognitive biases both in theoretical models (e.g., Beck, 1967) as well as in research (see 
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Mathews & MacLeod, 2005, for a review). The benefit derived from training in cognitive 
reappraisal is also well documented (Hanrahan, Field, Jones, & Davey, 2013), though 
some suggest that it encourages emotional suppression and question its utility (Valdivia-
Salas, Sheppard, & Forsyth, 2009). 
Problem solving consists of defining a problem and taking steps to formulate a 
positive solution to it. It frequently includes brainstorming, evaluating potential solutions, 
picking a solution, and evaluating it. Problem solving deficits are related to depression 
and self-harm (D’Zurilla, Chang, Nottingham, & Faccinni, 1998), anxiety (Chang, 
Downey, & Salata, 2004), and aggression (Stegge & Terwogt, 2007). This emotion 
regulation strategy focuses on changing the situation, and is evident in treatments such as 
DBT (Linehan, 1993) and problem solving skills therapy (Kazdin, Siegel, & Bass, 1992). 
Rumination is the process of passively, repetitively focusing on distress and 
potential causes for the distress (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). 
Rumination has been strongly linked with mood and anxiety disorders, particularly major 
depressive disorder (MDD) and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; Fresco, Frankel, 
Mennin, Turk, & Heimberg, 2002; Mor & Winquist, 2002). Recent work has focused on 
subtypes of rumination and making distinctions between these subtypes (e.g., abstract 
rumination and experiential mindfulness; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), finding that not 
all types are negative. 
Suppression is the process of removing emotions from the conscious experience, 
including internal feelings, external expressions, and thoughts associated with the 
emotion (Salters-Pedneault, Steenkamp, & Litz, 2009). Suppression can be looked at as 
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one particular subtype of avoidance, focusing on changing an emotional response that has 
already begun, the final stage in Gross and Thompson's model (2007). Ironically, 
suppression has been shown to increase a variety of emotional and physiological 
experiences, rather than decrease them, including increasing attentional bias toward a 
suppressed object (Lavy & van den Hout, 1994), increased unpleasant emotions 
(Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & Hofmann, 2006), increased physiological arousal 
(Gross & Levenson, 1993), and decreased behavioral approach toward emotionally 
evocative tasks (due to increased anxiety; Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004). 
While suppression has been associated with a range of mood and anxiety disorders, there 
is also evidence that its periodic and flexible utilization is associated with positive 
outcomes (Bonanno et al., 2004). This may be due to differential effects of different 
subtypes of suppression, for example suppressing the expression of emotions as opposed 
to suppressing the experience of emotions (Webb et al., 2012). 
Temporal Emotion Regulation 
In contrast to this focus on specific strategies for emotion regulation, Webb and 
colleagues (2012) focused on the timing of emotion regulation strategies. They began 
with Gross and Thompson’s (2007) process model of emotion, which identifies five 
salient points in time: situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, 
cognitive change, and response modification. Each of these five offers options for 
emotion regulation. The first four fall under antecedent-focused strategies, because they 
all occur before the emotion occurs. Response modulation is a response-focused strategy, 
and follows the experience of the emotion. Functional imaging studies have supported 
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this temporal distinction. Ochsner and Gross’s (2008) review describes a temporal 
distinction between reappraisal (antecedent-based) and suppression (response-based) 
where activation of the prefrontal cortex occurs earlier when participants are asked to use 
the former strategy, and later for the latter strategy. 
Webb and colleagues (2012) assert that the first two strategies have minimal 
research examining them experimentally, though there are a number of correlational 
studies examining their impact. Situation selection is the process of limiting or expanding 
which situations one is likely to be in, in an effort to prevent negative situations and 
increase positive situations. In one study examining situation selection, D’Zurilla, Chang, 
and Sanna (2003) found that students who avoided situations had lower self-esteem and 
positive problem orientation, and higher negative problem orientation, anger, and 
hostility. Situation modification happens after the situation occurs, but before any 
emotional reaction. For example, Fabes, Eisenberg, Karbon, Bernzweig, and Speer 
(1994) found that when mothers were asked to read a distressing story to their 
kindergartener or second-grader, they would insert more positive emotion when reading 
to their kindergartener. They also modified their reading of the story if they perceived 
their child as more emotionally reactive. A different reading of situation selection would 
argue that avoidance behaviors, particularly common in the mood and anxiety disorders, 
all represent situation selection, and that the behavioral component of cognitive 
behavioral therapy targets this stage of emotion regulation. From that perspective, there 
are a great deal of experimental studies examining the effects of situation selection and 
situation modification (e.g., Hofmann & Smits, 2008).  
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The third stage in Gross’s process model is attentional deployment. This involves 
focusing toward or away from particular aspects of the situation. Attentional deployment 
has been tested in a variety of ways, including directing participants to focus elsewhere 
(active distraction), increasing demands on working memory (passive distraction), or 
focusing on an image (concentration or rumination). Extensive research shows the effect 
of rumination is to increase the emotion being focused on (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008). Over several experiments, Van Dillen and Koole (2007) exposed participants to 
neutral, mildly negative, or strongly negative pictures, and then had them complete math 
problems of varying difficulty. More negative pictures led to a more negative mood. 
However, the impact on mood was decreased as the demand on working memory 
increased (i.e., more complex problems). Several neuroimaging studies have directly 
compared reappraisal (discussed below) and distraction, finding that distraction takes 
fewer cognitive resources and causes larger decreases in the amygdala, though 
reappraisal resulted in greater decreases in negative affect (e.g., Kanske, Heissler, 
Schonfelder, Bongers, & Wessa, 2011; McRae et al., 2010). McRae and colleagues 
(2010) also found that reappraisal required more attention on the affective stimulus, as it 
was attended to, and then changed, whereas distraction occurred before the initial 
affective meaning is created, further supporting the temporal nature of the process model. 
This interpretation is also supported by studies showing that memory is better for images 
where reappraisal is used, than images where distraction is used (Sheppes & Meiran, 
2007).  
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The fourth stage is cognitive change, including strategies such as reappraisal. This 
stage focuses on the meaning that is made of a situation, and may be altered by thinking 
of alternative possibilities, focusing on the situation objectively, or examining the 
evidence for and against a particular outcome (e.g., Fairholme et al., 2009). Reappraisal 
can focus on the emotional response, the emotional stimulus, or the perspective one takes. 
Webb and colleagues (2012) also included mindfulness, or non-judgmental observation, 
in the category of cognitive change, under the assumption that people automatically 
create judgements, and mindfulness represents a reappraisal of those emotions. 
The fifth stage of the process model is response modulation, and includes 
strategies such as suppression. This focuses on influencing physical, emotional, or 
behavioral processes, once they have already begun (Gross, 2013). Similarly, regulation 
of emotions at this stage can focus on suppression of the physical expression of emotion 
(behave so that an observer could not guess what you feel), the emotion itself (suppress 
all feelings), or thoughts of the emotion-eliciting event. These three styles of suppression 
behave somewhat differently, though are similar in that all can have ironic effects of 
increasing the emotional experience, particularly at the physiological level. People are 
generally able to suppress their behaviors, but their emotional experience and 
physiological reactions were less controllable, or responded in opposition to their 
attempts (Webb et al., 2012). 
Emotion regulation strategies apply across the temporal stages of an emotion, and 
also are linked with positive and negative outcomes across the range of psychopathology. 
This is evident not only in the deficits and their links to psychopathology described 
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above, but also in the increasing number of psychological treatments that focus explicitly 
on emotion regulation, such as DBT (Linehan, 1993), acceptance and commitment 
therapy (Hayes et al., 1999), emotion regulation therapy (Mennin & Fresco, 2009), and 
the unified protocol (Fairholme et al., 2009). One reason for the broad impact of emotion 
regulation may be due to its links with temperament (Rothbart & Sheese, 2007). Because 
of this, Rothbart and Sheese emphasized the need for multi-trait, multi-method 
approaches such as those described below. 
Limitations of Current Methods of Explicitly Assessing Emotion Regulation 
Current measures of emotion regulation largely consist of self-report 
questionnaires and are limited in several ways (see Tram-Quon, 2013, for a review). 
These measures often overlap with symptoms of psychopathology, yielding inflated 
relationships due to criterion contamination (e.g., Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003). Similarly, they also suffer from method effects. Their self-report 
nature, when combined with self-report questionnaires of other constructs of interest 
(e.g., psychopathology), will yield inflated correlations due to common-method variance 
(Nosek & Smyth, 2007). This can be accounted for, and mitigated, through multi-method 
assessments of both emotion regulation as well as psychopathology. 
Self-report measures are also open to reporting bias (e.g., desire to give the 
“correct” answer). In contrast, implicit measures of emotion regulation do not ask directly 
about emotion regulation, but measure it indirectly, frequently utilizing reaction time. 
These implicit measures have very short reaction times relative to explicit measures 
(several hundred milliseconds), making them difficult or impossible to consciously 
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control or bias one’s response. Egloff and Schmukle (2002) asked participants to present 
themselves in a positive light, as they would for a job interview, and then administered 
both an implicit (Implicit Attitudes Test) and explicit (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory) 
measure of anxiety. They found that participants appeared less anxious on the explicit 
measure, but not the implicit measure, as compared to a control group. This effect has 
been replicated across several other domains as well, demonstrating the ability of these 
measures to reduce or eliminate demand characteristics or social desirability bias 
(Asendorpf, Banse, & Mucke, 2002; Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001). 
Finally, explicit measures are often retrospective. Robinson and Clore (2002) 
found that people are generally poor retrospective reporters of their emotions. People 
instead utilize semantic cues to attempt to remember their emotions, which vary 
significantly from their episodic reports at the time of the emotion. It has been repeatedly 
found that people are poor reporters of their use of emotion regulation strategies and in 
addition, even when examined in the moment, they struggle to use emotion regulation 
strategies as instructed (Demaree, Robinson, Pu, & Allen, 2006). Driving home the 
disconnect between people’s understanding of their emotion regulation and their 
implicitly assessed emotion regulation, Mauss, Evers, Wilhelm, and Gross (2006) found a 
negative association between their implicit measure of emotion regulation and self-
reported emotion control. Taken together, these reasons make the manipulation of 
emotion regulation strategies difficult (e.g., randomizing participants to use particular 
strategies), impairing study of them. This is particularly true when a study depends on 
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participants understanding of, ability to report on, or ability to utilize specific emotion 
regulation strategies. 
Explicit measures of emotion regulation are also limited in their emphasis on 
individual strategies of emotion regulation. Aldao and colleagues (2010) found that 
psychopathology is differentially related to the type of emotion strategy utilized, finding 
generally that avoidance, suppression, and rumination were maladaptive and problem 
solving, cognitive reappraisal, and acceptance were adaptive. However, this is currently 
in question. For example, this conflicts with the findings of Bonanno and colleagues 
(2004) in their focus on flexibility of strategies. It also speaks to a point elucidated by 
Carl and colleagues (2013), assessing emotion regulation strategies in isolation may give 
a biased view, either over or underemphasizing people’s emotion regulation abilities. 
Finally, Butler and colleagues (2007) found that the negative effects of suppression as an 
emotion regulation strategy are culture dependent. They found that for people holding 
Western-European values (e.g., flexibility and independence, as measured by the 
European American Values Scale), suppression was associated with greater self-rated 
negative emotion, but not for people holding Asian values (e.g., norm conformity and 
interdependence, as measured by the Asian Values Scale). For people holding Asian 
values, higher use of suppression was associated with a slight decrease in self-reported 
negative emotion.  
Explicit measures of emotion regulation rely on a focus on individual strategies. 
This focus hinders study of the actual outcome of interest – how well people regulate 
their emotions, improving their ability to function in daily life. This focus on individual 
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strategies of emotion regulation is categorical in nature, examining first one strategy, then 
another, attempting to divide the construct of emotion regulation along arguably arbitrary 
lines. Unlike this focus on one strategy at a time, implicit measures allow for cross-
strategy assessment. For example, a participant can use both suppression of a negative 
emotion as well as cognitive reappraisal. It makes no difference to the implicit measure 
how emotion is regulated, only that it is regulated. This changes the discussion from one 
of which category of emotion regulation strategy was used, to one of how effectively 
were emotions regulated, how effectively was the participant able to pursue his or her 
goals? While not directly analogous, this categorical/dimensional debate reflects a similar 
one within the psychopathology assessment field, which is also examining attempts to 
study psychopathology without separating it into individual disorders. 
Limitations of Categorical Assessment of Psychopathology 
As reviewed in Brown and Barlow (2009), there are significant downsides to a 
categorical focus on psychopathology. Clinically relevant information as well as 
statistical variability is lost when artificially dividing dimensional constructs into 
categories. This is seen when dividing the continuum of severity into clinically 
interfering or not (i.e., disorder presence or absence), as well as when dividing 
psychopathology into categorical diagnoses (e.g., GAD and MDD; see Rosellini, 
Boettcher, Brown, & Barlow, 2015, for a review). When examining the presence or 
absence of a disorder, falling just above, or just below, the threshold for clinical 
significance makes a large difference, when in fact the difference in severity might be 
quite small, smaller than differences between two people who both fall on the same side 
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of this somewhat arbitrary cut point. Similarly, patients may meet the threshold for 
interference of a disorder, but lack one symptom from meeting full criteria. Pincus, 
McQueen, and Elinson (2003) found that these patients were not necessarily 
meaningfully different from patients who meet full criteria; however, they would be 
lumped into an undifferentiated not otherwise specified category. 
Broader limitations arise when considering the categorical classification of 
psychopathology. These include high rates of overlap, particularly among mood and 
anxiety disorders. For example, Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, and Mancill (2001) 
found that 67% of patients with a principal diagnosis of MDD would also meet for a 
diagnosis of GAD, if the DSM-IV hierarchy rule were ignored; 90% of those currently 
diagnosed with a mood disorder (MDD or dysthymia) were also diagnosed with an 
anxiety disorder. Along with evidence that higher-order factors (i.e., positive affect, 
negative affect, and autonomic arousal; Brown & Barlow, 2009) explain the shared 
variability among mood and anxiety disorders, this points to overarching similarities 
among these disorders, as opposed to clear categorical distinctions. This is also 
demonstrated in the National Institute of Mental Health’s (NIMH) decision to pursue the 
Research Domain Criteria (RDoC), a methodology emphasizing dimensional assessment 
across multiple domains (e.g., neuroimaging, behavioral outcomes, clinical presentation), 
instead of utilizing DSM-5, a mainly categorical methodology, for future research 
(Sanislow et al., 2010). The RDoC criteria focus on dimensional mechanisms of action 
(e.g., emotion regulation) over categorical disorders, with the eventual goal of identifying 
specific components that make up mental disorders without the limitations of working 
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within disorder categories that are due as much to convention as to evidence-base 
(Sanislow et al., 2010). This focus on dimensionality and multi-level evaluation call for 
inclusion of multi-method assessment, such as combining implicit and explicit measures 
of a given concept (e.g., emotion regulation) to utilize the strengths of each methodology 
while limiting the weaknesses. 
Benefits of Implicit Assessment of Emotion Regulation 
In light of these shortcomings, it is clear that additional, complementary 
assessments of emotion regulation are needed. Of particular interest is an implicit 
measure, one that is not impacted by social desirability, method effects, the limitations of 
memory, misinterpretations of emotion regulation strategies, or similarities to 
psychopathology. Many attempts have been made to study emotion implicitly. Gathering 
psychophysiological data is the most common way of doing this, and includes methods 
such as skin conductance, facial electromyography, heart rate variability, and functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (Potter & Bolls, 2012). Some of these measures (e.g., 
computer algorithms to assess emotion visually via web camera or to assess emotion 
based on written text) are making their way into commercial use, allowing companies to 
gather real-time data about the impact that their media content has on users of their 
websites, as well as allowing them to target advertising more precisely (Lawton, 2014). 
While most implicit assessments attempt to measure emotion, as opposed to 
emotion regulation, a few have attempted to directly assess emotion regulation, though 
there is debate as to the exact construct measured (e.g., emotion regulation itself or 
attitudes toward emotion regulation). Mauss and colleagues (2006) developed a variant of 
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the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) to assess 
emotion regulation (Emotion Regulation-IAT) where they paired the words “emotion 
regulation” with positive items and “emotion expression” with negative items (set 1), and 
then switched this pairing (set 2). By examining the differences in reaction times between 
the sets, they calculated an implicit evaluation of emotion regulation relative to emotion 
expression. This measure was modestly related to explicit measures of emotion 
regulation, all r’s < .21. In an anger provocation task, this measure was related to lower 
reported anger experience, fewer angry thoughts, and a lower threat-based cardiovascular 
reaction, but not anger behavior. Mauss and colleagues argue that these relationships 
suggest that the Emotion Regulation-IAT is a valid measure of implicit emotion 
regulation. Others (e.g., Mierke, & Klauer, 2003) suggest that instead of measuring the 
association between categories (i.e., emotion regulation and positive), the IAT instead 
measures other variables such as task switching ability, category salience, or knowledge 
of cultural stereotypes, or that they measure emotion regulation values as opposed to 
emotion regulation ability. 
Another way of implicitly assessing emotion regulation has been to measure the 
amount of interference caused by emotional tasks (i.e., emotional Stroop task). Just as the 
traditional Stroop task has been used for over 75 years to assess mental flexibility and 
semantic conflict (Stroop, 1935), this task has also been modified to assess emotional 
conflict by using words that are either emotionally neutral (e.g., apple) or emotionally 
charged (e.g., death) (MacLeod, 1991).  
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However, this “emotional Stroop” task is not thought to directly assess emotional 
conflict, but instead to assess how much the emotional stimuli draw attention away from 
the task, thus slowing reaction time (Etkin et al., 2006). Because of this, Etkin and 
colleagues developed their Emotional Conflict Task to more directly assess emotion 
regulation. Instead of presenting words in various colors of ink that were either 
emotionally salient or not, they presented a word (i.e., “HAPPY” or “FEAR”) overlaying 
an emotional face (portraying either happiness or fear). The task is then to identify the 
emotion portrayed in the face, despite the automaticity of reading the word. Similar to the 
original Stroop task, incongruent pairs (e.g., “FEAR” over a happy face) take longer to 
respond to than congruent pairs (e.g., “HAPPY” over a happy face), demonstrating 
emotional conflict. More interesting though is that when an incongruent pair follows an 
incongruent pair, reaction time is quicker than when an incongruent pair follows a 
congruent pair. While the brain bases are discussed below, it is hypothesized this effect 
occurs because the person recognizes the conflict and brings to bear cognitive resources 
to adapt to it, so as to be better prepared for the next conflictual task (adaptability; Etkin 
et al., 2006). Classic models of emotion regulation are focused on explicit behavioral 
changes to regulate emotion (e.g., Gross’s process model, 1998), which do not 
correspond well with this adaptability, measured implicitly. From this perspective, the 
Emotional Conflict Task does have similarities with attentional deployment, as both 
utilize cognitive resources to regulate emotion. From the emotion regulation strategies, 
adaptability is reminiscent of problem solving, in that one’s brain recognizes the problem 
(conflictual information) and takes steps to solve it (albeit automatically instead of 
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consciously). When partitioning emotion regulation into different stages (e.g., Gratz & 
Roemer, 2004), this adaptability is conceptually similar to one’s difficulty in engaging in 
goal-directed behavior and to one’s impulse control difficulties. 
This implicit measure of emotion regulation has a number of benefits. As seen 
above, emotion regulation applies transdiagnostically. An implicit measure assesses 
across diagnostic categories, and without the potential inflation due to overlap with DSM 
diagnostic criteria (e.g., as seen with rumination and depression, Treynor et al., 2003). 
This is particularly relevant given the transition currently underway in the assessment of 
psychopathology, a movement away from narrowly splitting pathology into distinct 
disorders, and a focus on the broader, transdiagnostic factors such as neuroticism and 
extraversion (e.g., Barlow, Sauer-Zavala, Carl, Bullis, & Ellard, 2014; Rosellini et al., 
2015). Just as this focus on the commonalities among disorders helps make sense of 
patterns of comorbidity and broad treatment response, a broader, outcomes-based 
measure of emotion regulation helps to clarify the confusion around past conflicting 
results of specific emotion regulation strategies. The question changes from one of “is 
this strategy adaptive or maladaptive” to “is this person able to pursue goals despite 
emotional conflict?” 
Additionally, this measure is not dependent on participants’ recall, ability to 
control their use of emotion regulation strategies, or reporting bias. It simply depends on 
their reaction time. Given this design, it can be used as part of a multi-method 
assessment, allowing for the examination of method effects when paired with more 
classic measures of emotion regulation. Finally, and at its core, it is not focused on 
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particular strategies, which indicate emotion regulation; it is a more direct measure of 
participants’ ability to control their initial responses and act in a desired direction. Our 
ultimate interest in emotion regulation is in how effectively people are able to pursue 
their goals in the face of difficulty. This implicit measure of emotion regulation lays aside 
the detailed and distracting questions often answered in emotion regulation (e.g., which 
strategy, how often, when in the experience) and focuses simply on how well participants 
are able to, in the face of distractors, pursue a goal. 
Brain Bases of Emotion Regulation 
The study of emotion regulation has also focused on the brain correlates of 
emotion regulation. There have been numerous imaging studies focusing on executive 
processes, including emotion regulation. Rueda, Posner, and Rothbart (2004) identified 
three attention networks, with the third network responsible for monitoring and resolving 
conflicts. This network is made up of the ACC and the lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC; see 
Ochsner & Gross, 2008 for a review). Emotion regulation is associated with activation in 
higher- and lower-order systems. For example, reappraisal utilizes activation of lateral, 
and orbital PFCs and inhibition of the amygdala (Ochsner & Feldman-Barrett, 2001), 
while distraction utilizes the dorsal ACC (Sheppes & Meiran, 2007). The ACC balances 
emotional responses, including conflict monitoring and resolving conflicts between 
higher- and lower-order systems (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012; Ochsner & Feldman-Barrett, 
2001). It is connected to several other parts of the brain, from the higher-order frontal 
cortices to lower-order areas such as the amygdala. The ACC is activated, among other 
times, when a person is deciding among multiple competing responses such as during the 
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traditional Stroop task (Bench et al., 1993), or emotional Stroop task (Haas, Omura, 
Constable, & Canli, 2006). Additionally, in an emotional conflict task similar to the one 
used by Etkin and colleagues, Haas, Omura, Constable, and Canli (2007) found that the 
activation of the ACC is associated with neuroticism. Further, they found that it showed 
specificity within neuroticism, as measured by the Revised NEO Personality Inventory 
(NEO-PI-R). The NEO-PI-R has several subscales within neuroticism, including one that 
measures anxious symptoms (N1) and one that measures depressive symptoms (N3). 
Haas and colleagues found that the emotional task they used was associated with N1, but 
not with N3. This is similar to findings from Etkin and Schatzberg (2011), discussed 
below. 
It is for these reasons that Etkin and colleagues (2006) examined the ACC, 
amygdala, and PFC with their Emotional Conflict Task. In the Emotional Conflict Task, 
during the emotional trials, incongruent trials led to activation of the ACC and 
dampening of the activity of the amygdala (Etkin et al., 2006). By contrast, when the 
non-emotional correlates were used (e.g., judging gender of the faces), no activation of 
the ACC or dampening of the activity of the amygdala was observed. Instead, the 
fusiform gyrus (responsible for facial recognition) and the PFC were activated (Egner et 
al., 2008). This illustrates the importance and specificity of the ACC to emotional tasks, 
and the ability of this Emotional Conflict Task to change the levels of activation in the 
neural circuitry responsible for emotion regulation. 
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Behavioral Outcomes of the Emotional Conflict Task 
The Emotional Conflict Task provides behavioral outcomes in the form of 
reaction times. Just as with the original Stroop task, incongruent trials (i.e., where the 
stimulus word and portrayed emotion do not match) take more time to respond to than 
congruent trials. This is a measure of emotional conflict. Of particular import, 
incongruent trials that follow other incongruent trials are responded to more quickly than 
incongruent trials that follow congruent trials (adaptability; Etkin et al., 2006). Etkin and 
colleagues found that following an incongruent task, the ACC activates, allowing for 
more rapid conflict resolution on the next incongruent task. However, this adaptability 
was not seen in a study comparing people with GAD to a control group. In that case, 
people with GAD showed just as much delay on incongruent trials that followed 
congruent trials, as on incongruent trials that followed incongruent trials, suggesting that 
people with GAD were not utilizing their ACC in the same way that were people without 
GAD (Etkin et al., 2006). Or, from a behavioral standpoint, their ability to regulate their 
emotions, allowing them to act in a desired way, was compromised. 
Of note, there have been some conflicting findings utilizing the Emotional 
Conflict Task. A second study compared patients with GAD, major depressive disorder 
(MDD), or both disorders to participants with no disorders. While patients with MDD, 
GAD, or both showed increased amygdala activation and deficits in the ventral ACC and 
a lack of ability to dampen amygdala activity (Etkin & Schatzberg, 2011), the patients 
with MDD showed increased activity in their lateral PFC. Consequently, the patients with 
MDD did not show behavioral effects of the lack of amygdalar dampening (i.e., lack of 
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reaction time adaptability). Etkin and Schatzberg argue that they were able to compensate 
for their ACC deficits by activating their lateral PFC. Jarcho and colleagues (2013) 
utilized this task, comparing two samples of adults who, as children, scored high or low 
on a measure of behavioral inhibition. They failed to find behavioral differences (i.e., 
adaptability) between the two groups. However, when they re-examined the analyses 
based on the presence of a lifetime psychiatric disorder, they found that those who had a 
lifetime diagnosis showed no adaptability, whereas those free from any lifetime diagnosis 
did adapt to incongruent trials when they followed incongruent trials. While Jarcho and 
colleagues (2013) found that adaptability was more closely tied with lifetime psychiatric 
diagnosis than with childhood temperament, they did not address how current 
temperament and current psychiatric diagnosis relate to adaptability on the Emotional 
Conflict Task. 
Current Study 
Thus far, the Emotional Conflict Task has been used with clinical samples only a 
few times, focusing on one or two disorders at a time. These studies had relatively small 
sample sizes for the clinical portion of the studies. Etkin, Prater, Hoeft, Menon, and 
Schatzberg (2010) examined GAD on its own (clinical n = 17). Etkin and Schatzberg 
(2011) compared GAD and MDD (n = 57, utilizing the previous sample of 17). There 
have also been several studies focusing on non-clinical samples (e.g., Jarcho et al., 2013; 
Torres-Quesada, Korb, Funes, Lupianez, & Egner, 2014); however, the assessment of 
emotion regulation is most relevant within a clinical sample, as this is the population that 
most struggles with emotion regulation deficits. The question of whether emotion 
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regulation is more related to diagnostic constructs or dispositional traits is a particularly 
interesting one, as there is evidence for both hypotheses (e.g., Dennis, 2007; Jarcho et al., 
2013). While past studies have compared patients meeting one or two diagnostic 
categories with healthy control participants, the current study will examine patients 
across the spectrum of mood and anxiety disorders. Utilizing this dimensional approach 
to the assessment of psychopathology offers a number of strengths over categorical 
assessment (e.g., Rosellini et al., 2015). This study will dimensionally assess both 
psychopathology (e.g., depressed mood, worry, social fear) as well as personality traits of 
neuroticism and extraversion. This will provide both a richer examination of the 
Emotional Conflict Task than it has undergone to date, applying the Emotional Conflict 
Task to a clinical sample that is highly comorbid and diagnostically varied, as well as 
answering the National Institute of Mental Health’s call for transdiagnostic research that 
cuts across levels of analysis (Insel et al., 2010).  
Study Aims and Hypotheses 
Aim 1: To assess the convergent and divergent validity of the Emotional Conflict Task as 
a measure of emotion regulation. It is hypothesized that participants will be slower to 
respond to incongruent trials than to congruent trials (emotional conflict), but that 
incongruent trials that follow incongruent trials will not take as long as incongruent trials 
that follow congruent trials (adaptability). This adaptability will be correlated with 
explicit measures of emotion regulation (i.e., Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance 
Questionnaire [MEAQ], Distress Aversion subscale, and Difficulties in Emotion 
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Regulation Scale [DERS], Difficulty Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior subscale), 
more so than the dimensional measures of psychopathology or temperament. 
Aim 2: To assess the incremental validity of the Emotional Conflict Task. It is 
hypothesized that the measure of adaptability in the Emotional Conflict Task will account 
for additional variance beyond the explicit measures of emotion regulation (i.e., MEAQ, 
Distress Aversion subscale, and DERS, Difficulty Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior 
subscale) in predicting overall functional impairment (i.e., Work and Social Adjustment 
Scale). 
Aim 3: To assess the relationship between the implicit measure of emotion regulation, 
dimensional psychopathology constructs, and temperament (specifically neuroticism and 
extraversion). Following the findings of Jarcho and colleagues (2013), where the 
presence of a lifetime disorder, as opposed to the presence of high behavioral inhibition, 
predicted a lack of adaptability, it is hypothesized that emotion regulation will be more 
strongly related to the dimensional measures of anxiety than to temperament (i.e., Albany 
Panic and Phobia Questionnaire, Interoceptive subscale, Generalized Anxiety Disorder – 
7, Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, and Revised Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory). 
Because of the mixed findings regarding depression (Hass et al., 2007, Etkin & 
Schatzberg, 2011), depression as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory-II is not 
hypothesized to correlate with adaptability. Following the findings of Brown, White, 
Forsyth, and Barlow (2004) and Bourgeois and Brown (2015), it is hypothesized that 
adaptability will moderate the relationship between neuroticism and worry. Finally, it is 
27 
 
 
hypothesized that adaptability will be more strongly related to neuroticism than to 
extraversion. 
Research Design and Methods 
Participants 
Sixty outpatients were drawn from those assessed upon presentation for treatment 
at the Center for Anxiety and Related Disorders and who are engaged in the 
Classification of Depression and Anxiety study. Inclusion criteria consisted of meeting 
DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for a current mood or anxiety disorder. Diagnoses were 
established using the Anxiety and Related Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-5 
(ADIS-5). Participants were excluded if they endorsed current suicidal or homicidal 
intent and/or plan or displayed psychotic symptoms or significant cognitive impairment 
(e.g., diagnosis of dementia, mental retardation) according to DSM-5 criteria. The 
average age of participants was 29.78 years (SD = 11.09), with a range of 18 – 70. Thirty-
six of the participants were women, 24 men. Most participants identified as Caucasian 
(88.3%), 6.7% identified as Asian, 5.0% identified as African American (see Table 1).  
28 
 
 
Table 1 
Demographic Characteristics of Outpatient Sample (N = 60) 
 Gender n % 
Female 34 56.7 
Male 26 43.3 
Race   
Caucasian 53 88.3 
African-American 3 5.0 
Asian 4 6.7 
Ethnicity   
Hispanic 3 5.0 
Non-Hispanic 57 95.0 
Age   
18-30 40 66.7 
31-65 
  65+ 
18 
2 
30.0 
3.3 
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Principal diagnoses were assigned to the disorder deemed to be most interfering. 
GAD was the most common principal diagnosis (23.3%), followed by obsessive-
compulsive disorder (16.7%), and social anxiety disorder (15.0%). Other disorders (e.g., 
MDD, panic disorder, etc.) were principally interfering in fewer than 10% of the 
participants (see Table 2). The sample was highly comorbid, with most participants 
having multiple disorders (see Table 3). 
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Table 2 
Principal and Additional Diagnoses of Outpatient Sample (N = 60) 
Diagnosis 
Principal Diagnosis 
      n               % 
Additional Diagnoses 
        n                  % 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder 14 23.3 5 8.3 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 10 16.7 3 5.0 
Social Anxiety Disorder 9 15.0 19 31.7 
Other Specified Anxiety Disorder, GAD 5 8.3 4 6.7 
Specific Phobia 5 8.3 2 3.3 
Major Depressive Disorder 3 5.0 5 8.3 
Panic Disorder 3 5.0 5 8.3 
Personality Disorder 3 5.0 0 0 
Agoraphobia 2 3.3 5 8.3 
Persistent Depressive Disorder 2 3.3 0 0 
Adjustment Disorder 1 1.7 0 0 
Somatization Disorder 1 1.7 2 3.3 
Unspecified Anxiety Disorder 1 1.7 2 3.3 
Unspecified Depressive Disorder 1 1.7 4 6.7 
Illness Anxiety Disorder 0 0 1 1.7 
Trichotillomania 0 0 1 1.7 
Body Dysmorphic Disorder 0 0 1 1.7 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 0 0 1 1.7 
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Table 3 
Number of Clinical Diagnoses in Outpatient Sample (N = 60) 
Number of Clinical 
Diagnoses n % 
1 24 40.0 
2 25 41.7 
3 6 10.0 
4 3 5.0 
5 1 1.7 
6 1 1.7 
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Clinician Rated Measure 
Anxiety and Related Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-5 (ADIS-5, 
Brown & Barlow, 2014). The ADIS-5 is a semi-structured clinical interview designed to 
make reliable current and past diagnosis of the DSM-5 anxiety, mood, obsessive-
compulsive, trauma-related, somatoform, and substance use disorders. The ADIS-5 is 
administered by doctoral students or doctoral-level psychologists, and requires the 
assessor to make dimensional ratings (0, not present, to 8, very severe) of the key and 
associated symptoms of panic disorder, agoraphobia, social anxiety disorder, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, GAD, and MDD, whether or not a formal diagnosis is under 
consideration. Dimensional ratings of other disorders (e.g., specific phobias, post-
traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, etc.) are also made. Screening questions for 
several less common disorders (e.g., psychosis, eating disorders, etc.) are also asked. 
Previous editions of the ADIS have been shown to reliably diagnose the majority of 
anxiety and mood disorders (e.g., Brown, Di Nardo, Lehman, & Campbell, 2001).   
Computer Task 
Emotional Conflict Task (Etkin et al., 2006). An Emotional Conflict Task 
developed by Etkin et al. (2006) was used to evaluate emotion regulation. The task 
consists of a presentation of 148 slides with happy or fearful expressions drawn from the 
set of Ekman and Friesen (1976). The slides are cropped to show only the face, and the 
words “FEAR” or “HAPPY” are written in prominent red letters over the face. Slides are 
presented for 1000 milliseconds (ms) with a varying inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 3000-
5000 ms (mean ISI = 4000 ms). Total task time is approximately 15 minutes. The slides 
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were presented in a pseudorandom order to counterbalance for condition (congruent-
congruent, congruent-incongruent, incongruent-congruent, and incongruent-incongruent). 
To prevent repetition priming effects, there were no direct repetitions of the same face on 
subsequent slides (Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003). Participants were instructed to respond 
as quickly and accurately as possible by pushing response buttons corresponding to 
“fear” (right index finger) or “happy” (right middle finger) for the affect expressed in the 
face. Behavioral data were analyzed in SPSS and consisted of reaction times (excluding 
error and post-error trials) and accuracy rate. The mean reaction time difference between 
congruent and incongruent slides was calculated to measure emotional conflict.  The 
mean difference between incongruent slides that follow congruent slides, and incongruent 
slides that follow incongruent slides, was calculated to measure adaptability. Accuracy 
rate was examined to assess effort and understanding of the task. To ensure 
understanding of the task, a training block of 25 slides preceded the task, and an accuracy 
rate of 85% was required to proceed to the task. Incorrect responses, and the slide 
immediately following, were not analyzed. Responses more than two standard deviations 
from the mean were taken as mistaken button presses, and also discarded. The slides were 
presented on a Lenovo Thinkpad T530 with a 2.90 gigahertz Intel processor and a 15.6-
inch monitor. Participants were seated approximately 20 inches away. Participants 
responded using the left and right arrows on a standard keyboard. 
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Self-Report Measures 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck & Steer, 1987). The BDI-II is a 21-
item self-report questionnaire designed to assess the occurrence of depression symptoms 
over the past two weeks. The total score was used as a measure of depressed mood. 
Albany Panic and Phobia Questionnaire (APPQ; Rapee, Craske, & Barlow, 
1994/1995). The APPQ is a 27-item self-report scale designed to assess fear of 
interoceptive sensations, agoraphobic situations, and social phobia. The 8-item 
Interoceptive subscale (APPQ-I) was used as a measure of panic. 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7 scale (GAD-7; Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams, & 
Lowe, 2006). The GAD-7 is a 7 item self-report questionnaire that measures the 
frequency of worry and several associated symptoms. It was used as a measure of worry. 
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick, Peters, & Clarke, 1989). The 
SIAS is a 20-item self-report questionnaire, which was used to measure interpersonal 
social concerns (i.e., distress when initiating and maintaining conversations with friends, 
strangers, potential mates, etc.). 
Revised Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002). The OCI-R 
is an 18-item self-report measure designed to assess the frequency of obsessions and 
various compulsive behaviors (e.g., washing, ordering, checking). The total score was 
used to measure intrusive thoughts and compulsions. 
NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NFFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992). The NFFI is a 60-
item self-report measure of the five-factor model of personality. The neuroticism (NFFI-
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N) and the extraversion scales (NFFI-E) were used to measure the personality traits of 
neuroticism and extraversion. 
Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire (MEAQ; Gámez, 
Chmielewski, Kotov, Ruggero, & Watson, 2011). The MEAQ is a 62-item questionnaire 
that measures six dimensions of experiential avoidance. The 13-item Distress Aversion 
subscale was used as an indicator of emotion regulation through avoidance of negative 
feelings. 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The 
DERS is a 36-item questionnaire measuring 6 facets of emotion regulation, including 
understanding and awareness of emotions. The 5-item Difficulty Engaging in Goal-
Directed Behavior subscale was used to measure emotion regulation. 
Work and Social Adjustment Scale (WSAS; Hafner & Marks, 1976). The 
WSAS is a 5-item measure that assesses the extent to which current symptoms interfere 
with work, home management, private leisure activities, social activities, and family 
relationships. It was used as the outcome measure of impairment.  
Each of the aforementioned measures is well established in the psychometric and 
clinical literature and has been shown to possess acceptable reliability and validity. 
Procedures 
Individuals interested in seeking treatment at the Center for Anxiety and Related 
Disorders undergo an intake evaluation consisting of an ADIS-5 assessment and a packet 
of self-report questionnaires of personality and psychopathology. Before beginning this 
intake evaluation, they have the opportunity to participate in a long-standing study on the 
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classification of depression and anxiety. For those interested, formal consent was 
obtained. Following the intake evaluation, patients completed several computer-based 
cognitive tasks, including the Emotional Conflict Task. These tasks, along with 
information gathered from the intake assessment (i.e., diagnostic information, 
questionnaire scores), were used in the current study. 
Data Analysis 
Aim 1: The hypothesis that emotional conflict will result in longer response times 
for incongruent trials than congruent trials was assessed using paired sample t-tests. The 
hypothesis that adaptability will result in shorter reaction times for incongruent-
incongruent trials than congruent-incongruent trials, was also assessed using paired 
sample t-tests. The hypothesis that the adaptability outcome on the Emotional Conflict 
Task will be strongly related to explicit measures of emotion regulation was assessed 
using intra-class coefficient (ICC). This will allow for the correlation among multiple 
measures of emotional regulation (i.e., adaptability, MEAQ Distress Aversion subscale, 
and DERS Difficulty in Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior subscale). Divergent 
validity was assessed by comparing these correlations with bivariate correlations between 
the adaptability outcome and the measures of psychopathology and temperament. The 
differential magnitude of these associations was evaluated using the dependent 
correlations z-test presented in Meng, Rosenthal, and Rubin (1992). It is hypothesized 
that adaptability will be more strongly correlated with the Difficulty in Engaging in Goal-
Directed Behavior subscale than with the Distress Aversion subscale, and more strongly 
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related to both of these measures than to the measures of psychopathology and 
temperament (e.g., GAD-7, NFFI-N). 
Aim 2: To assess the incremental validity of adaptability, hierarchical regression 
was utilized. In the first step, impairment caused by psychopathology (i.e., WSAS) was 
regressed on the explicit measures of emotion regulation (i.e., MEAQ Distress Aversion 
and DERS Difficulty Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior), with adaptability added in 
step 2. A statistically significant increase in the variance of impairment accounted for in 
step 2 would indicate incremental validity of adaptability beyond current explicit 
measures of emotion regulation. 
Aim 3: To assess the relationship between emotion regulation, dimensional 
constructs of psychopathology, and temperament, adaptability were correlated with 
measures of psychopathology (e.g., the GAD-7 to measure worry) and with measures of 
temperament (e.g., the Neuroticism subscale of the NFFI to measure neuroticism). The 
differential magnitude of these associations was evaluated using the dependent 
correlations z-test presented in Meng and colleagues (1992). It is hypothesized that 
adaptability will negatively correlate more strongly with the measures of anxiety (i.e., 
APPQ-I, GAD-7, SIAS, and OCI-R) than with the measure of neuroticism (i.e., NFFI-N). 
Because of the mixed findings regarding depression (Etkin & Schatzberg, 2011; Hass et 
al., 2007), depression as measured by the BDI-II is not hypothesized to correlate with 
adaptability. It is hypothesized that decreased adaptability will increase the strength of 
the relationship between neuroticism and worry. This was tested by regressing GAD-7 on 
NFFI-N and adaptability, and then on NFFI-N, adaptability, and their product term. 
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Power Considerations 
No previous research had examined this question dimensionally, so a direct 
estimate of effect size was not possible. However, an approximation was drawn from the 
effects found in Etkin and colleagues (2010), examining the group difference (GAD vs. 
healthy control groups) in adaptability. They found a significant difference, t(39) = 2.39, 
p < .05, with a large effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.8). Given that power is lost when 
categorizing dimensional groups, using an effect size of d = .8 to estimate the effect of 
symptom severity on adaptability (i.e., Aim 3) seems appropriately conservative within 
the current design. A power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007) showed that given this effect size, an alpha of .05, and a power of .9, the 
required sample size would be 57 participants.  
Results 
Aim 1 
To assess the impact of congruence on reaction time, paired sample t-tests were 
run. The mean reaction time (and standard deviation) for congruent trials was 721.09 
(119.18) ms; for incongruent trials it was 784.90 (133.63) ms. This led to a significant 
mean difference of 63.81 ms, t(59) = 11.19, p < .01, with incongruent trials taking longer 
to respond to than congruent trials, as expected. The reaction time for incongruent trials 
that followed incongruent trials (iI) was 786.87 (146.85) ms. The reaction time for 
incongruent trials that followed congruent trials (cI) was 782.21 (123.89) ms. The 
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difference between these two represents the measure of adaptability, 4.66 (49.80) ms. 
This difference was not significantly different from zero, t(59) = 0.73, p = .47. 
Adaptability was approximately normally distributed, skew = 0.56 (0.31), kurtosis = 0.18 
(0.61), and Q-Q plot appeared normal. To assess convergent validity, the ICC was 
calculated for adaptability, MEAQ, and DERS.  This led to a non-significant correlation, 
ICC(1,1) = -.04, F(59, 120) = 0.87, p = .72. Adaptability was not significantly correlated 
with the MEAQ, r(58) = .04, p = .76, or the DERS, r(58) = .12, p = .35 (see Figure 1). 
The DERS was not more strongly correlated to adaptability than was the MEAQ, z = 
0.47, p = .64. When comparing the correlated correlation coefficients using Meng and 
colleagues (1992) methods, the omnibus test of heteroscedasticity was non-significant, 
2(8) = 2.31, p = .97. Contrasting the correlations between adaptability and the two 
explicit measures of emotion regulation with the correlations between adaptability and 
the seven measures of psychopathology and personality also showed a non-significant 
difference, z = 0.61, p = .54 (see Figure 2 for an illustration of the association between 
adaptability and the GAD-7). 
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Figure 1.  Scatterplot of adaptability and Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale 
(DERS) – Difficulty Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior subscale. 
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Figure 2.  Scatterplot of adaptability and Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7 scale (GAD-7).  
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Aim 2 
To assess incremental validity over current measures of emotion regulation, the 
WSAS was regressed on the MEAQ Distress Aversion and DERS Difficulty Engaging in 
Goal-Directed Behavior subscales (model 1), and then on the MEAQ, DERS, and 
adaptability (model 2). The omnibus test of model 1 was significant, F(2,57) = 3.62, p = 
.03, and model 2 was non-significant, F(3, 56) = 2.38, p = .08 (see Table 4). In model 1, 
the MEAQ Distress Aversion subscale was not significantly related to WSAS, b = -0.00, 
t(57) = -0.02, p = .99, holding DERS Difficulty Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior 
constant, though the DERS Difficulty Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior subscale did 
predict WSAS beyond the MEAQ Distress Aversion subscale, b = 0.65, t(57) = 2.65, p = 
.01. Model 2 adds the measure of adaptability; the MEAQ Distress Aversion subscale 
remained non-significant, b = -0.00, t(56) = -0.01, p = .99, the DERS Difficulty Engaging 
in Goal-Directed Behavior subscale remained significant, b = 0.65, t(56) = 2.62, p = .01, 
and adaptability was non-significant, b = -0.00, t(56) = -0.13, p = .90, all holding the 
other two measures constant. There was no increase in R2 (.11 in both models).  
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Table 4 
Incremental Validity of Adaptability Measure, Overall Model Fit and Regression 
Coefficients 
Modela Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F p 
1 b Between Groups 2 584.17 292.08 3.62 .03 
 Within Groups 57 4600.77 80.72   
 Total 59 5184.93    
       
2 c Between Groups 3 585.51 195.17 2.38 .08 
 Within Groups 56 4599.42 82.13   
 Total 59 5184.93    
a  Dependent Variable: WSAS    
b  Predictors: (Constant), DERS Goals subscale, MEAQ Distress Aversion subscale 
c  Predictors: (Constant), DERS Goals subscale, MEAQ Distress Aversion subscale, 
Adaptability 
 
 
Modela  B SE B t p  R2 
1 (Constant) 5.00 4.26 1.17 .25 .11 
 MEAQ Distress Aversion subscale  0.00 0.10 -0.02 .99  
 DERS Goals subscale  0.65 0.25 2.65 .01  
       
2 (Constant) 4.96 4.31 1.15 .26 .00b 
 MEAQ Distress Aversion subscale 0.00 0.10 -0.01 .99  
 DERS Goals subscale 0.65 0.25 2.62 .01  
 Adaptability 0.00 0.02 -0.13 .90  
a  Dependent Variable: WSAS Final Score 
b  F(1, 56) = .02, p = .90 
Note. WSAS = Work and Social Adjustment Scale; DERS = Difficulty in Emotion 
Regulation Scale; MEAQ = Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire 
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Aim 3 
To assess the relationship between emotion regulation, dimensional constructs of 
psychopathology, and measures of temperament, correlations were run between these 
measures and adaptability. Adaptability was not correlated with either measure of 
emotion regulation, MEAQ Distress Aversion r(58) = .04, p = .76, DERS Difficulty 
Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior r(58) = .12, p = .35. Adaptability was also 
uncorrelated with both measures of temperament, NFFI-N r(58) = .03, p = .85 and NFFI-
E r(58) = .04, p = .76. Correlations with measures of psychopathology ranged from -.01 
to .16. These correlations were all non-significant (see Table 5). 
To assess the impact of adaptability on the relationship between neuroticism and 
worry, the GAD-7 was regressed on NFFI-N and adaptability, before adding the product 
term of the NFFI-N and adaptability. The omnibus test of model 1 was significant, 
F(2,57) = 13.00, p < .01, as was model 2, F(3, 56) = 8.64, p < .01 (see Table 6). In model 
1, the NFFI-N subscale was significantly related to GAD-7, controlling for adaptability, b 
= 0.34, t(57) = 5.10, p < .01, and adaptability was non-significant, after accounting for 
NFFI-N b = -0.00, t(57) = -0.20, p = .84. Model 2 adds the interaction between NFFI-N 
and adaptability, which was non-significant, b = -0.00, t(56) = -0.50, p = .62. There was 
minimal increase in R2, .31 in model 1, .32 in model 2, F(1, 56) = 0.25, p = .62.  
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Table 6 
Impact of Adaptability Measure on the Relationship Between NFFI-N and GAD-7 
Modela Source df 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square F p 
1 b Between Groups 2 582.70 291.35 13.00 <.01 
 Within Groups 57 1277.48 22.41   
 Total 59 1860.18    
       
2 c Between Groups 3 588.45 196.15 8.64 <.01 
 Within Groups 56 1271.74 22.71   
 Total 59 1860.18    
a  Dependent Variable: GAD-7 
b  Predictors: (Constant), Adaptability, NFFI-N 
c  Predictors: (Constant), Adaptability, NFFI-N, NFFI-N * Adaptability 
 
 
Modela  B SE B t p  R2 
1 (Constant) 1.15 2.08 0.55 .58 .31 
 NFFI-Neuroticism 0.34 0.07 5.10 <.01  
 Adaptability 0.00 0.01 -0.20 .84  
       
2 (Constant) 1.00 2.12 0.47 .64 .00b 
 NFFI-Neuroticism 0.35 0.07 5.08 <.01  
 Adaptability 0.01 0.03 0.40 .69  
 NFFI Neuroticism * Adaptability 0.00 0.00 -0.50 .62  
a  Dependent Variable: GAD-7 
b  F(1, 56) = .25, p = .62 
Note. GAD-7 = Generalized Anxiety Disorder 7-item scale; NFFI-N = NEO Five-Factor 
Inventory – Neuroticism subscale; NFFI-E = NEO Five-Factor Inventory – Extraversion 
subscale.
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Exploratory Analyses 
Given the non-significant findings above, several exploratory analyses were 
conducted. Due to this measure’s past significant findings particularly with regard to 
GAD diagnosis (e.g., Etkin et al., 2010), the sample was divided into two groups based 
on the severity of their GAD diagnosis. This was done in two different ways, both based 
on ADIS severity ratings (0 – 8). First, groups were divided by clinically significant 
impairment versus subclinical impairment (GAD severity ratings of 4 and above vs. 3 and 
below). Second, they were divided on presence or absence of GAD symptoms (severity 
ratings of 1 and above vs. 0). Then adaptability was compared between these pairs of 
groups, again with non-significant results, t(58) = .60, p = .55 and t(58) = -1.06, p = .29, 
respectively. Adaptability was then regressed on demographic variables (i.e., sex, age, 
race, and ethnicity), as well as measures of psychopathology (i.e., BDI-II, GAD-7, SIAS, 
OCI-R, APPQ-I). This regression was not significant, F(9, 50) = 0.59, p = .80, and none 
of the individual variables approached significance (all p’s > .15). In a final exploration, 
adaptability was regressed on demographic variables and measures of temperament and 
overall functional impairment (i.e., WSAS, NFFI-N, NFFI-E). This regression was not 
significant, F(7, 52) = 0.39, p = .90, and none of the individual variables approached 
significance (all p’s > .15). 
Following the lack of significant findings in all analyses examining the measure 
of adaptability, initial analyses of the modified Stroop Effect were conducted. This 
examined the time discrepancy for incongruent compared with congruent trials, and the 
relationship between this measure and measures of psychopathology, personality traits, 
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and overall impairment. The modified Stroop Effect was not correlated with either 
measure of emotion regulation, MEAQ Distress Aversion r(58) = .05, p = .70, DERS 
Difficulty Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior r(58) = .11, p = .40. Adaptability was 
also uncorrelated with both measures of temperament, NFFI-N r(58) = -.02, p = .89, and 
NFFI-E r(58) = .11, p = .39. Correlations with measures of psychopathology ranged from 
r(58) = -.05 to .19. These correlations were all non-significant (see Table 7). 
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Table 7 
Correlations Among Measures of Modified Stroop Effect, Explicit Emotion Regulation, 
Temperament, Psychopathology, and Overall Impairment 
  Stroop Effect 
MEAQ   .05 
DERS   .11 
NFFI-N -.02 
NFFI-E   .11 
GAD-7   .14 
BDI-II   .02 
SIAS -.05 
APPQ-I   .17 
OCI-R   .00 
WSAS   .14 
Note. All p’s > .15 MEAQ = Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire; 
DERS = Difficulty in Emotion Regulation Scale; NFFI-N = NEO Five-Factor Inventory 
– Neuroticism subscale; NFFI-E = NEO Five-Factor Inventory – Extraversion subscale; 
GAD-7 = Generalized Anxiety Disorder 7-item scale; BDI-II = Beck Depression 
Inventory – II; SIAS – Social Interaction Anxiety Scale; APPQ-I = Albany Panic and 
Phobia Questionnaire – Interoceptive subscale; OCI-R – Obsessive-Compulsive 
Inventory – Revised; WSAS = Work and Social Adjustment Scale. 
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Discussion 
Current Findings 
The overarching goal of this study was to validate the Emotional Conflict Task, 
one of the few implicit measures of emotion regulation. With regard to the behavioral 
component of the Emotional Conflict Task, the current study is the largest clinical sample 
examined to date, and the first to also examine current psychopathology dimensionally. 
Utilizing a rigorous semi-structured clinical assessment and well-validated self-report 
measures, this study established both categorical diagnoses as well as dimensional 
measurements of temperament and psychopathology. These assessments were then 
compared to several measures from the Emotional Conflict Task, principally the measure 
of adaptability, or participants’ ability to adapt to a second incongruent presentation 
following an initial incongruent presentation.  
The current study replicated the lack of adaptability in a clinical sample. 
However, it did not find support for the Emotional Conflict Task as a dimensional 
assessment of emotion regulation. It found no relationship with measures of emotion 
regulation, psychopathology, temperament, or overall impairment. This lack of 
relationship appeared both at the zero-order level, as well as when accounting for other 
variables (e.g., adaptability was unrelated to ruminative worry, after accounting for 
neuroticism). In addition, exploratory analyses examined the Stroop Effect, the increase 
in reaction time for incongruent presentations over congruent presentations. These 
analyses found no relationship between the Stroop Effect and explicit measures of 
emotion regulation, psychopathology, personality, or functional impairment.  
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This measure has been evaluated previously in a few small samples, where 
psychopathology was examined categorically (i.e., a healthy control group was compared 
with a clinical group). Findings in these studies were more robust for differences in fMRI 
than for differences in behavior (i.e., adaptability), and consistently found lower 
activation of the ACC in participants with depression or GAD than in healthy controls. 
Sometimes these studies also found a lack of adaptability in the clinical group (e.g., Etkin 
& Schatzberg, 2011). In the one prior study of the Emotional Conflict Task that examined 
temperament dimensionally, the findings were mixed, with adaptability not significantly 
related to temperament, though it was related to a categorical presence or absence of a 
lifetime disorder (Jarcho et al., 2013). 
Because this study did not precisely replicate prior studies, a direct comparison of 
effects is not possible; however, the most similar study is Etkin et al. (2010). In that 
study, exact reaction times for various conditions (e.g., incongruent trials) were not 
given, but can be approximated from the figures provided. They found that incongruent 
trials took approximately 80 ms longer than congruent trials, similar to the increase of 
63.81 ms in the current study. In that study healthy controls decreased their reaction time 
for incongruent trials that followed incongruent trials (as opposed to incongruent trials 
that followed congruent trials) by approximately 30 ms, while patients with GAD 
increased their reaction time by approximately 15 ms, a large effect, d = 0.8. In the 
current study on average participants’ reaction times increased by 4.66 ms, and this 
adaptability was unrelated to measures of psychopathology (see above). Overall, this 
shows that the basic Stroop Effect was comparable between these studies, but that 
52 
 
 
adaptability was not related to dimensional measures of mental health. 
In addition to examining the implicit measure of emotion regulation, this study 
also assessed two explicit measures of emotion regulation (i.e., MEAQ Distress Aversion 
subscale and DERS Difficulty Engaging in Goal-Directed Activities subscale). In 
examining these two measures of emotion regulation, there were areas of overlap and 
difference. Both were significantly related to measures of worry and depression; 
however, the DERS was related to all measures of psychopathology (i.e., also the SIAS 
and OCI-R) as well as overall impairment (i.e., WSAS). From a cognitive-behavioral 
perspective, this may reflect a broader transdiagnostic feature of this DERS subscale, 
namely the ability to accomplish goals during times of distress. In contrast, the MEAQ 
subscale focuses on the desire to avoid suffering and distress, but does not assess broad 
behavioral ability. The differential focus of these two emotion regulation measures is 
further clarified by the non-significant relationship between them. 
Implications 
The lack of significant findings with the Emotional Conflict Task is somewhat 
unexpected given that several smaller, categorical studies have found a behavioral effect 
of the Emotional Conflict Task. Several potential explanations are considered below.  
For several reasons this study has increased power over past studies, including 
both the larger sample size and that variability and hence predictive power is increased 
when examining constructs dimensionally rather than categorically. It is therefore 
unlikely that the lack of significant findings is due to a lack of power. 
This study looked to validate the Emotional Conflict Task within a clinical 
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sample, the population where emotion regulation research is most salient. Consequently, 
it did not include a healthy control condition. The only past study to compare this task 
with dimensionally assessed constructs was Jarcho and colleagues (2013), who compared 
it with dimensional measures of temperament. Similar to the current study, they did not 
find a behavioral relationship between temperament and adaptability. They did find a 
relationship when splitting the sample categorically based on presence or absence of a 
lifetime diagnosis (irrespective of current diagnosis). This may be a partial explanation of 
the lack of results in the current study, as everyone, by definition, had a lifetime diagnosis 
(i.e., current diagnosis was an inclusion criteria). Of note, in Jarcho and colleagues’ 
(2013) study, neuroimaging found ACC deficits in both analyses, those examining 
temperament and those examining diagnosis, emphasizing the work still to be done 
reconciling behavioral measures and neuroimaging. 
In addition to Jarcho and colleagues’ (2013) study, Etkin has also found in 
unpublished studies a lack of behavioral differences when examining psychopathology 
dimensionally. For this reason, he always includes a healthy control group as well as 
neuroimaging data, which has been more robust than the behavioral outcomes (personal 
communication, June 24, 2015). For example, Etkin and Schatzberg’s (2011) study of 
patients with GAD and MDD found neurological impairment in both groups, as 
compared with healthy controls, but only found behavioral deficits in the GAD group, 
speaking to the limitations of the behavioral aspects of this measure. This also speaks to 
the importance of publishing null findings to avoid the file drawer effect, and the 
repetition of studies that have been completed but were not published (Ioannidis, 2005). 
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Assessing the incremental validity of categorical predictors over dimensional 
predictors, Oathes, Patenaude, Schatzberg, and Etkin (2015) examined resting state 
neuroconnectivity using fMRI, examining both categorical disorder labels and continuous 
measures of disorders. In predicting neural connectivity and neural deficits, including 
those that underlie the behavioral response to the Emotional Conflict Task, they found 
that neither a categorical nor a continuous classification of disorders was able to explain 
as much variance as the combination. That is, the categorical predictors of GAD and 
MDD diagnosis added significantly beyond the continuous predictors (GAD-7 and BDI-
II) in predicting neural connectivity and deficits, highlighting the importance of 
categorical predictors with this measure. Similarly, in their meta-analysis of 
neuroimaging studies across psychological disorders, Goodkind and colleagues (2015) 
found a general deficit in the ACC across disorders, but were able to pinpoint very few 
distinctions between disorders. These point to the importance of categorical definitions of 
mental health with this task, as well as broader limitations in our ability to precisely link 
neuroimaging studies with behavioral outcomes or clinical findings as this task attempts 
to do. 
An alternative hypothesis is that this effect is somewhat transient in nature, that it 
is not a robust effect. Recent work by Egner, Ely, and Grinband (2010) demonstrated that 
as the ISI increased, adaptability decreased, and was undetectable when the ISI was 
greater than 2,500 – 3,000 ms. In the current task, the average ISI was 4,000 ms, and the 
minimum was 3,000 ms. While this does not explain why past research (e.g., Etkin et al., 
2006) has found an effect with this ISI, it may partially explain the inconsistent findings 
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(e.g., Jarcho et al., 2013), and suggest a change in the methodology used for this task, 
decreasing the ISI. 
Finally, a more recent examination of the Emotional Conflict Task also largely 
failed to find significant results (Robinson, Safer, Austin, & Etkin, 2015). They examined 
a sample of participants with binge eating disorder, as compared with healthy controls. 
Adaptability was not significantly different between the participants with binge eating 
disorder and the healthy controls, and in fact trended in the opposite direction 
hypothesized, with healthy controls showing less of an adaptation effect, Cohen’s d =      
-.27. 
Taken together, these findings demonstrate the unreliable nature of the Emotional 
Conflict Task as an assessment of emotion regulation. Relationships with explicit 
measures of emotion regulation were not significant in the current study. Measures of 
temperament and psychopathology were also not significantly related to adaptability. In 
other studies, these relationships have been inconsistent. Several studies have found a 
relationship between adaptability and the presence or absence of psychopathology, 
whereas other studies have failed to find this relationship. Particularly noteworthy is the 
poorer performance of this measure when utilized with dimensional assessment of 
psychopathology.  
In addition to the inconsistent findings with the Emotional Conflict Task, it is 
unclear whether the task is a valid measure of emotion regulation. This task purports to 
measure participants’ ability to adapt to emotional conflict, and posits that as emotion 
regulation. This emotional conflict is ostensibly created by participants’ viewing of 
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emotional faces; however, it is not clear that the simple viewing of emotional faces elicits 
a salient emotional response. Without any emotional response to regulate, it would be 
difficult or impossible for the Emotional Conflict Task to assess emotion regulation. 
Aldao (2013) expresses concerns about the limitations of emotion, and particularly 
emotion regulation, assessments that utilize relatively passive viewing of standardized 
images, much like the Emotional Conflict Task. Without eliciting emotions to be 
regulated, it is likely that this task instead measures cognitive processes involved in 
emotion regulation (e.g., conflict recognition, conflict resolution), as opposed to emotion 
regulation itself. Aldao emphasizes the need for increased examination of the ecological 
validity of emotion regulation assessments, and suggests ecological momentary 
assessment, allowing for the assessment of emotion in the daily life of participants.  
Findings from several neuroimaging studies also raise questions about the 
specificity of the Emotional Conflict Task to emotional conflict. While neuroimaging 
studies utilizing the Emotional Conflict Task have focused on the ACC as a whole, and 
on its role in resolving emotional conflict, alternative explanations exist. Milham and 
Banich (2005) examined the ACC using the Stroop task, finding that sub-regions respond 
differently from one another. Specifically, they found that while the anterior ACC 
responded to conflict specific stimuli, the posterior ACC responded to task-irrelevant 
information broadly, even when it was non-conflictual. Given the differential response of 
these sub-regions, Milham and Banich suggest that instead of reflecting conflict 
resolution per se, the ACC may be more broadly related to either conflict-related or error-
related processing, as well as response facilitation and inhibition. Wittfoth and colleagues 
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(2010) also examined the ACC using a speech task that utilized conflict between 
semantic content and prosody. They found distinct neural pathways for happy versus 
angry prosody, further solidifying the idea that the effects of the ACC cannot be 
explained by a single unifying theory, but are instead nuanced and multifaceted. Overall, 
these findings call into question the specificity of the ACC for emotional conflict 
resolution, and thereby emotion regulation. 
The Emotional Conflict Task is not alone in this debate about validity. Studies of 
the one other implicit measure of emotion regulation have also failed to find significant 
relationships. Using an emotion regulation implicit attitudes test (ER-IAT) Mauss and 
colleagues (2006) found that higher scores on the ER-IAT were associated with better 
performance emotionally and physiologically during an anger provocation task. 
However, the ER-IAT was unrelated to measures of psychopathology including measures 
of depression (BDI-II), anxiety (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory), anger (State-Trait Anger 
Expression Inventory), and defensiveness (Marlowe Crowne Scale). Similarly, Hopp, 
Troy, and Mauss (2011) found that the ER-IAT was unrelated to measures of depression, 
social adjustment, or psychological well-being, except in a subgroup who used 
reappraisal at a higher frequency. Mauss et al. (2006) suggest that these results may 
reflect implicit emotion regulation measures’ assessment of participants’ responses to 
specific situations more so than broader traits of emotion regulation. At the same time, it 
again speaks to the unreliability of these implicit measures at this time. 
Another consideration when utilizing implicit measures is the measurement 
properties of implicit measures. In an examination of the predictive validity of the IAT, 
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Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, and Banaji (2009), found that the IAT was moderately 
correlated with clinical domains (e.g., anxiety and depression), but that explicit measures 
such as questionnaires were more strongly correlated with these clinical domains. This is 
similar to the current results in that the explicit measures accounted for significant 
variability of the measure of overall disorder severity, but different in that in the current 
study there was no significant correlation for the implicit measure. Perhaps more so than 
explicit measures, implicit measures are impacted by a wide variety of moderators that 
may impact the outcome of a study. Perugini, Richetin, and Zogmaister (2010) 
extensively reviewed potential moderators, finding that the outcomes of studies can 
depend on factors as disparate as cognitive load, mortality salience, need for cognition, 
affective focus, time pressure, positive (but not negative) mood, and more. They point out 
that generally spontaneous behavior is more correlated with implicit measures, while 
deliberate behavior is more correlated with explicit measures. While emotion regulation 
is a spontaneous behavior, all the other measures of emotion regulation as well as 
psychopathology in this study were explicit measures. The combination of shared method 
variance (i.e., self-report questionnaires for the explicit measures of emotion regulation 
and the dimensional measures of psychopathology and temperament) and the range of 
factors that impact implicit measures may be contributing factors to the unpredictable 
nature of the Emotional Conflict Task’s relationship with other measures. 
Overall, these findings speak to the complex interplay of neurology, implicit 
assessment, and psychopathology. It suggests that we are not yet to the point of 
neuroimaging reliably predicting behavioral outcomes or psychological difficulties, and 
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also speaks to the imprecision inherent in implicit assessment. This emphasizes that, 
while this is a rich area of research, it is not yet a reliable or valid predictor of 
psychopathology useful at the clinical level.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
While offering several distinct strengths, such as a focus on dimensional 
assessment and the largest clinical sample size examined for this measure, there were 
several limitations to this study. One limitation is that the study did not include a healthy 
control group or neuroimaging. This would have allowed for a full replication of past 
studies, and may have offered insight into the lack of replication of Etkin’s studies (e.g., 
Etkin et al., 2010). If the behavioral effect appeared between the healthy control group 
and the clinical group, but not within the clinical group that would offer some validation 
of its ability to discriminate psychopathology from its complete lack of relationship with 
psychopathology. A lack of that difference would further call into question the 
replicability of these results.  A similar logic follows from including imaging data, in 
particular in this case as the neuroimaging results have been more robust across studies 
than the behavioral assessment. 
Implicit measures are clearly a useful area of research for the future, offering 
clinicians and researchers the ability to assess concepts that patients may be unaware of, 
uncomfortable disclosing, or simply discrepant from their explicit beliefs. This has clear 
clinical implications (e.g., suicidal behavior, Nock et al., 2010), social implications (e.g., 
national discussion of race and police violence; Payne, 2001), and industrial implications 
(e.g., career aspirations, Rudman & Phelan, 2010). Much as the excitement around 
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genetic causes of, or empirically supported treatments for, psychopathology were initially 
hailed as a panacea and then were tempered; our enthusiasm around implicit measures 
also must now be tempered, as we focus on more nuanced, sophisticated questions of 
their utility. Roth and Fonagy’s (2004) question “What works for whom, under what 
circumstances?” could not be more applicable.  
While this study failed to find the hypothesized effects of the Emotional Conflict 
Task, it does offer additional guidance about “under what circumstances.” Namely, this 
task generally appears to differentiate between healthy controls and the presence of 
psychopathology (though not always, e.g., Robinson et al., 2015), as opposed to 
differentiating among gradations of psychopathology. One potential hypothesis for this 
finding could be that psychopathology is a categorical construct, with a distinct 
difference between its presence and absence. However, the preponderance of the 
evidence does not support this claim. While some studies find taxonic properties, 
particularly when examining MDD (e.g., Ruscio, Zimmerman, McGlinchey, Chelminski, 
& Young, 2007), the vast majority of recent research into the taxonomy of 
psychopathology has found it to be dimensional in nature (e.g., Haslam, Holland, & 
Kuppens, 2012; Prisciandaro & Roberts, 2005). 
Given the inconsistent findings with the Emotional Conflict Task, particularly 
when assessing psychopathology dimensionally, alternative measures are called for. 
Given the theoretical and empirical evidence surrounding the importance of being able to 
behaviorally approach goals in the face of distress, objective or in vivo measures of this 
ability could prove very useful. Aspects of emotion regulation, such as inhibition, can be 
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assessed readily through current measures (e.g., go/no-go neuropsychological tasks). 
Other implicit assessment includes psychophysiological assessment, such as vagal tone. 
However, there is debate whether this consists of a measure of emotion or of emotion 
regulation (e.g., Porges, Doussard-Roosevelt, & Maiti, 1994). As seen in this study, the 
DERS Difficulty in Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior subscale was associated with a 
broad range of temperament and psychopathology. One objective measure of emotion 
regulation would be to create an in vivo assessment of this subscale, exposing 
participants to a distressing situation, such as was done in Mauss and colleagues study 
(2006), and then asking them to complete standardized tasks, particularly assessments of 
concentration and persistence (e.g., continuous performance task, n-back digit addition). 
There is a small literature demonstrating the impact of stress on concentration (e.g. 
Schoofs, Preuss, & Wolf, 2008); however, this has not yet been generalized to examine 
its relationship with psychopathology. It is reasonable to hypothesize that increased 
ability to concentrate under distressing situations would correlate with measures of 
emotion regulation, and be predictive of decreased psychopathology, but this is an 
empirical question which must be answered with future research.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this study provided a strong evaluation of the Emotional Conflict 
Task. This task was not supported in the dimensional assessment of emotion regulation, 
and was not found to be related to explicit measures of emotion regulation or to either 
psychopathology or temperament. Several possible explanations for this were discussed, 
as well as the current, limited state of neuroimaging and implicit measures’ ability to 
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reliably predict psychopathology. Future research is necessary to continue to clarify 
questions about the implicit measurement of emotion regulation, with a particular focus 
on creating more reliable and valid implicit measures. 
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2. Ross, A.M., Emmert-Aronson, B.O., DeVoe, E.R. (2014, August). A mixed 
methods examination of concordance between self-reported veteran mental 
health and spousal perceptions of symptom severity and their effects on 
parenting stress. Poster session presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Psychological Association, Washington, DC. 
3. Cooper-Vince, C. V., Emmert-Aronson, B. O., Pincus, D. B., & Comer, J. S. 
(2012, August). The diagnostic utility of separation anxiety disorder 
symptoms: An item response theory analysis. Poster session presented at the 
annual meeting of the European Association for Behavioral and Cognitive 
Therapies, Geneva, Switzerland. 
4. Rosellini, A. J., Emmert-Aronson, B. O., St. Paul, M. S. & Brown, T. A. (2011, 
November). The relevance of age of onset to the psychopathology of social 
phobia. Poster session presented at the annual meeting of the Association for 
Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies, Toronto, Ontario. 
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5. Emmert-Aronson, B. O., & Brown, T. A. (2010, May). An IRT analysis of 
depression. Poster session presented at the annual meeting of the Association 
of Psychological Science, Boston, Massachusetts.  
6. De Nadai, A., Leyfer, O., Smith, L., Farchione, T. J., Emmert-Aronson, B., & 
Barlow, D. H. (2008, November). Individual versus group treatment for social 
anxiety disorder in a clinical setting. Poster session presented at the annual 
meeting of the Association for Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies, Orlando, 
Florida. 
7. De Nadai, A., Smith, L., Farchione, T. J., Emmert-Aronson, B., & Barlow, D. H. 
(2008, November). Effectiveness of cognitive behavioral therapy for anxiety 
and depression in a clinical setting. Poster session presented at the annual 
meeting of the Association for Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies, Orlando, 
Florida. 
8. De Nadai, A., Smith, L., Farchione, T. J., Emmert-Aronson, B., & Barlow, D. H. 
(2008, November). Effectiveness of therapists-in-training under supervision. 
Poster session presented at the annual meeting of the Association for 
Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies, Orlando, Florida. 
9. De Nadai, A., Smith, L., Farchione, T. J., Emmert-Aronson, B., & Barlow, D. H. 
(2008, November). Robustness of cognitive behavioral therapy with 
heterogeneous clinical populations. Poster session presented at the annual 
meeting of the Association for Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies, Orlando, 
Florida.  
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